

**[WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD COMPANY LETTERHEAD]**

9455113

July 26, 1994

Mr. R. A. Holten, Director  
Quality, Safety and Health  
Programs Division  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Richland Operations Office  
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Holten:

**EXERCISE "FRASER" FINAL CRITIQUE**

Attached is the final critique from the June 9, 1994, Emergency Exercise "Fraser." There were fifteen identified weaknesses, which will be entered into the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Quality, Environmental, Safety Tracking (QUEST) System. Persons indicated as actionees will have 30 calendar days from the date of issuance of this report to respond to the Hanford Emergency Exercise Program office with corrective action plans, committed completion dates, and a Priority Planning Grid (PPG) value.

Twenty-eight improvement items were also identified. These improvement items have been forwarded to the appropriate organization for implementation.

Should you have any questions or comments regarding this matter, please contact me on 376-5570, or S. M. Faulk of my staff on 376-0688.

Very truly yours,

J. W. Tritz, Manager  
Emergency Preparedness  
Emergency, Safety, and Quality Services

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Attachment

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**EXERCISE FRASER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Exercise Objective**

On June 9, 1994, Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) conducted a Quarterly Emergency Preparedness Field Exercise for the U.S. Department of Energy. The exercise

code name is "Fraser." The terminal objective for this exercise was for the U. S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) and Hanford Site contractors to demonstrate their ability to protect the health and safety of the general public, Hanford employees, and the environment by utilizing applicable emergency plans, procedures, and agreements.

The exercise scenario was designed to activate: the 327 Building Emergency Organization; the 300 Area Emergency Control Center (ECC) and supporting emergency response personnel; the Emergency Management Center (EMC); the Emergency Decontamination Facility (EDF); the RL Emergency Control Center (RL-ECC) including the RL-Emergency Action and Coordinating Team (RL-EACT), the Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC), and the Field Team Coordination Center (FTCC); the Joint Information Center (JIC); the Benton/Franklin County Emergency Operations Center; the Washington State Emergency Operations Center, Oregon State Emergency Operations (partial), and a control cell at the DOE-HQ Emergency Operations Center.

### **Exercise Fraser Scenario Summary**

The exercise scenario briefly was as follows: An empty waste transfer cask at the 327 Building falls from a hoisting crane into a fuel storage basin breaching a number of the 200 fuel pins in the basin. For purposes of observing the application of the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for the 327 Building, the scenario specifies that the fuel pins are unvented. The event causes the canyon CAMs and the stack CAM to alarm. Three PNL employees receive some contamination, with one of them also suffering a lacerated arm, and an RL employee is injured.

It was expected that the scenario would result in the event being quickly assigned an emergency level of a General Emergency based on the 327 Building EALs, which would then permit the opportunity for on-site practice with a variety of consequence assessment activities, protective action decisions, and protective action recommendations. While the Building Emergency Director and various emergency control centers did not interpret the event indicators as a General Emergency for an extended time, the exercise still permitted the opportunity for valuable practice of various radiological release verification activities. The exercise also illustrated important lessons about the types of not-always-productive interchanges that occur between control centers. This happens when the information available through the formal channels seems inadequate or inconsistent to those trying to use it for decision making.

### **Conduct of the Exercise Evaluation**

An evaluation team separate from the control organization was established to conduct an independent and comprehensive evaluation of the exercise. The evaluators were guided by criteria based on procedures, which served as the central measures of the objectives outlined for the exercise. Evaluators, controllers, and exercise players were also invited to provide descriptions of good practices they noted, problems they had encountered, or suggestions for improvements.

Sources of inputs for the evaluation include the evaluator assessment of each of the criteria, additional evaluator comments on the Objective Evaluation comments provided on Exercise

Finding worksheets provided to almost all participants at the close of the exercise, and observations offered by players during the immediate post-exercise debriefings held at each emergency control center. Further clarification of these comments was obtained through phone calls where necessary. Meetings were conducted between and lead evaluator and WHC emergency preparedness staff to specify the major issues raised by the exercise, identify the likely organizational or technical source of the problems observed during the exercise, discuss preliminary recommendations for eliminating or minimizing these problems in the future, and assign an actionee to each of the weaknesses and improvement items identified.

### **Results of the Exercise Evaluation**

Of the 95 objectives examined by evaluation team, 80 were met, 11 were not observed, and 4 were not met. The additional 19 objectives relating to the Benton/Franklin County EOC and the State of Oregon were not included in this exercise evaluation.

The 4 objectives not met, in the judgement of the evaluators during the exercise, were as follows:

#### Area Emergency Control Center (Area ECC)

1. Maintain emergency logs. (10186)

#### Event Command Post (ECP)

2. Determine and implement protective actions. (10149)

#### Hanford Patrol

3. Support a Columbia River alerting. (10244)

#### Facility Personnel

4. Properly respond to emergency signals (10220)

With respect to the objective for the Hanford Patrol of supporting a Columbia River alerting, similar objectives for PNL and the RL-EACT were judged by other evaluators to not be observed (see below). Later discussions with players and controllers indicated that an exercise control problem was a major contributor to the difficulty in ascertaining the progress of the Columbia River alerting activity.

The 11 objectives which the evaluators were unable to observe or did not think could be demonstrated by the exercise play were as follows:

#### RL-Emergency Action and Coordinating Team (RL-EACT)

1. Support a Columbia River alerting. (10249)

#### Joint Information Center (JIC)

2. Coordinate public information with the county public information officer located in the JIC. (10146)
3. Confer with offsite PIOs prior to each media briefing and news release (10240)

#### Area ECC

4. Establish access control to the ECC. (10156)

#### Occurrence Notification Center

5. Establish required conference call bridge to DOE HQ. (10192)

#### Hanford Patrol

6. Provided emergency traffic control during emergency conditions. (10209)

#### Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL)

7. Support a Columbia River Alerting. (10337)

#### Washington State Emergency Operations Center

8. Demonstrate the capability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely manner.
9. Demonstrate the capability to identify the need for external assistance and to request such assistance from federal and other support organizations.
10. Demonstrate the capability to explain the basis of the plume Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) to the Radiological Advisory Group (RAG).
11. Demonstrate the capability to provide advice to county officials during plume protective action decision making.

#### Identified Weaknesses and Improvement Items

Following WHC-CM-4-43, G-4.05. Exercise Critiques and Finding Tracking (Rev 0), no deficiencies were identified, From the observations of the evaluation team and the more than a hundred comments and recommendations offered by the exercise participants, the evaluators have formulate 15 weaknesses and 28 improvement items for attention or consideration by the WHC and PNL Emergency Preparedness organizations. These are listed in the following section, Exercise Fraser Issues.

A weakness is defined as: "...a finding which indicates an inability to meet evaluation

criterion/criteria which degrades the demonstration of a standard...." Items identified as weaknesses will be addressed for corrective action and tracked to closure.

An improvement item is defined as: "...an observation or finding citing deviations or concerns regarding a particular criterion. An improvement item, by itself, does not degrade the adequate demonstration of a standard, but the emergency response could be made more effective if the identified industry practices or good emergency management practices were implemented...." The improvement items are called out as a suggested means for improving the emergency response.

The recommendations listed for addressing the following issues emerged for the most part from the initial discussions of what was the likely source of the various problems. These recommendations are not meant as requirements nor are they meant to limit the development of a corrective issue. The actionee may discover further information or alternatives when addressing the issue.

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## **EXERCISE FRASER ISSUES**

### Issues Identified as Weaknesses

In relation to field team coordination:

W-1. Issue:

There are inconsistencies in the way the PNL and WHC field teams (i.e., survey teams outside the event area) collected and reported field team data, and inattention by the FTCC to procedures for identifying team members and logging data from each team.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the nature and extent of differences in normal practices, equipment, and training for the WHC and PNL field teams.
- Evaluate the procedures for the coordination of field team data collection and revise as necessary in order to achieve consistency and integration of the field team, FTCC, and UDAC activities related to the use of field survey data.
- Consider incorporating and PNL field team supervisor into the FTCC when direction of these teams passes to the FTCC during an emergency.
- Consider field observation opportunities during exercises for one or more FTCC team members to familiarize them with the conditions under which the teams function.
- In conjunction with PNL, develop a training approach for assuring that PNL, develop a training approach for assuring that PNL and WHC teams receive the same training.
- Develop a procedure for maintaining consistency in equipment and training for emergency event surveys by WHC and PNL field teams.

Actionee: D. A. Marsh

W-2. Issue:

There was a substantial time lapse (nearly two hours) in obtaining field survey data which was critical to recognition of the magnitude of the release.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the procedures and strategy for deploying field teams both before and after the FTCC is operational for aspects that may delay data collection.
- Consider the development of a pre-established strategy and sampling plans that would permit a more autonomous, aggressive, and timely deployment of field monitoring assets.

**Actionee: D. A. Marsh**

In relation to the Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC):

W-3. Issue:

There was a delay in establishing the hazards assessment network because one phone on the net was off the hook and unattended for a brief period.

Recommendation:

- Compare all UDAC and Area ECC procedures related to the activation of the hazards assessment network to be sure that only one point has responsibility for its initial activation, and that the responsibility does not conflict with other duties for that position.

Actionee: D. A. Marsh

W-4. Issue:

Information did not get shared frequently among the teams in UDAC as per the procedure.

Recommendations:

- Ensure that the procedure for conducting periodic briefings is followed during UDAC operations.
- During UDAC training emphasize the purpose and importance of these periodic briefings for assuring that information gathered by one UDAC team is quickly available to other teams, to avoid redundant information search activities and assessment delays.

Actionee: D. A. Marsh

W-5. Issue:

The necessary hazards assessment documentation for the affected facility was not available in the UDAC.

Recommendations:

- Examine all supporting documentation currently in UDAC for completeness.
- Coordinate with persons responsible for EACT and other control centers to assure that all current procedures related to the operation of that particular center are available there.
- Establish a system for ensuring that incoming documentation is complete and that the inventory in each center is kept complete.

Actionee: D. A. Marsh

In relation to the event classification process:

W-6. Issue:

The Building Emergency Director (BED) did not follow the procedures and guidelines for determining the initial event classification and for relaying this initial classification information to the Occurrence Notification Center (ONC).

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the appropriateness of the EAL for this type of event at the 327 building.
- Evaluate the clarity of the written procedure for BEDs, related to making the initial event classification and relaying it.
- Evaluate and revise as necessary the training for all BEDs and relevant Area ECC staff with respect to the use of EALs and relaying the initial notification information to the ONC.
- Assist PNL in developing and providing training for the PNL BEDs and 300 Area ECC staff that is consistent with that provided to WHC BEDs and other Area ECCs staff.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)  
J. B. Schuette

W-7. Issue:

The responsibility and procedure for event reclassification is not clearly defined in the emergency response procedures for the various control centers.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the relevant control center procedures for the specification of the event reclassification responsibility and criteria.
- Evaluate the BED procedures for the need to clearly indicate when the authority to classify or reclassify an event shifts up the command structure.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

In relation to the Event Command Post:

W-8. Issue:

Facility survey strategies and procedures are not well defined or understood.

Recommendations:

- Specify the objectives for field surveys of the area and facility, and their relationship to those for the field teams that operate beyond the event area during an emergency.
- Develop a statement of a strategy for meeting event facility survey objectives.
- Evaluate the consistency of this strategy for emergency surveys with routine procedures of RPTs and HPTs.
- Develop and approach for providing training for RPTs and HPTs for emergencies that will emphasize their role in providing timely and useful information to the Event Command Post and the Area ECC.
- Develop a way to incorporate into the training for relevant Area ECC staff information on the strategy for facility surveys during emergencies and procedure for obtaining the results of these surveys.

Actionee: G. A. Lovejoy (lead)

D. S. Gunnink

W-9. Issue:

Procedure was not followed for keeping track of personnel assigned to and operating from the Event Command Post.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the procedure for adequate attention to this responsibility, both initially for all building occupants, and also for those being sent back to or into the building on response assignments.
- Include in training for BEDs the need to conduct (assign) this personnel tracking, in order to assure the safety of persons under the direct command



of the ECP.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)

J. B. Schuette

W-10. Issue:

The BED did not recommend shelter for remaining 300 Area personnel in accordance with the building protective actions (Part II) for an Alert Classification.

Recommendation:

- Assist PNL in developing and providing training for the PNL BEDs and 300 Area ECC staff that is consistent with that provided to WHC BEDs and other Area ECCs staff. Conduct remedial mini-drill at the event facility.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)

J. B. Schuette

In relation to Support for the River Alerting Process

W-11. Issue:

The activation of PNL support for Columbia River alerting was attempted by the RL-EACT via the POC and at the Alert Class level, contrary to the procedure which states that river alerting will not be conducted unless at the level of Site Area emergency or higher and is automatically activated by the ONC.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the concerns on the part of the RL-EACT Security Director and others that river alerting should be done at the initial stage of any level of emergency at a facility as close to the river as those in the 300 are, for example.
- Discuss with the offsite authorities responsible for the decision to conduct river alerting the concern that this protective action needs to be carried out immediately during emergencies at facilities near the river to ascertain if the criteria should be changed.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

In relation to communications among control centers:

W-12. Issue:

The existence of multiple lines of contact between various control centers, including offsite EOCs, contributed to the appearance of inconsistencies in information, and in some instances resulted in response staff being distracted from their central functions in order to clarify information or respond to extraneous requests for information.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the current formal lines of communication in view of alternatives for getting the same information to all relevant parties simultaneously.
- Call out in responder training the reasons behind trying to maintain communication "gateways" in order to minimize the emergency of inconsistent information, reduce time-consuming information validate, and minimize the number of people distracted from their central responsibilities by demands for information that is available elsewhere.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

In relation to the 300 Area Emergency Control Center:

W-13: Issue:

Procedure usage in 300 Area ECC was poor. Most positions did not have procedures on their desks. Forms were not filled out properly and often: times and dates omitted; to/from information omitted.

- Evaluate the message forms in use for formats that encourage the inclusion of important times and identifiers.
- Evaluate the efficacy of assigning the responsibility of putting out procedures to the Emergency Preparedness Advisor or administrative staff as the center is activated.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer

In relation to the RL Emergency Action and Coordinating Team (EACT)

W-14. Issue:

EACT responders did not refer to procedures, which could have prevented them from making mistakes. Event logs were marginal.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the efficacy of assigning the responsibility of putting out procedures to the Emergency Preparedness Advisor or administrative staff as the center is activated.
- Examine the intent of logs, make an analysis which logs are necessary to have, and use training to enhance awareness of the consequences of not having adequate logs.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

In relation to the activation of medical assets for emergency decontamination.

W-15. Issue:

The medical and radiation staff assigned to the EDF were not provided adequate time to activate the facility and prepare to receive the injured contaminated worker prior to the arrival of the ambulance because the formal notification process for activating the decontamination process was not followed. This procedure has been the source of problems in past exercises, suggesting that the notification procedure for activating medical staff is not appropriate for accomplishing the objective of timely medical attention in cases involving radiological contamination.

#### Recommendation

- Examine current procedures to see if they are still applicable to current conditions and staffing on site.
- Analyze the possibility of making the on-call physician the first point of contact on medical emergencies.
- Analyze the potential for using the 911 dispatch as the contact with the HEHF on-call physician.
- Review past exercises where this has also occurred for further insights into consequences and source of the problem.

Actionee: S. M. Gilchrist (lead)  
D. E. Hare

#### **Issues Identified as Improvement Items**

In relation to field team coordination:

I-1. Issue:

Difficulty with field team communications (i.e., with survey teams outside the event area) was again a problem, related to the limitations of radio and cellular phone communication. Potential sources of the problems include mechanical and locational aspects of the current set-up of the FTCC radio equipment, and the overload of the safety channel due to multiple uses.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the location of the base stations in UDAC, to try to reduce feedback.
- Evaluate the microphones that are in the FTCC to try to reduce background noise.
- Evaluate the connection to the antenna.
- Talk with radio maintenance about location of repeaters, and map likely communication "dead spots" on and around the site so field teams can be alerted to these.

- Examine the current usage of the safety channel, in terms of who has authority to use it and the potential for reducing overload.
- Consider training program for radio users about how to increase the effectiveness of their verbal communications of data through consistent message formats and use of terms.

**Actionee: D. A. Marsh**

I-2. Issue:

FTCC team expressed their concern that evaluators unfamiliar with the procedures are unrealistic or off the mark in their critiques.

Recommendation:

- Reevaluate the UDAC and FTCC exercise evaluation criteria for consistency and scope in relation to the most current UDAC and FTCC procedures.

**Actionee: D. A. Marsh**

In relation to the Unified Dose Assessment center (UDAC)

I-3. Issue:

The process for routing and obtaining signatures on approval stamps for protective action recommendations developed by UDAC needs to be more efficient.

Recommendations:

- Re-evaluate the need for all of the signatures currently required.
- Have a specialist analyze the process for how it can be accomplished more rapidly.

Actionee: D. A. Marsh

I-4 Issue:

A number of messages were received in the State EOC that were not marked exercise traffic. Most of these came from UDAC.

Recommendation:

- Examine message forms collected after Fraser for source and frequency of this problem.
- Emphasize in UDAC training and in pre-exercise player training.

Actionee: D. A. Marsh

In relation to the event classification process:

I-5 Issue:

The approach decided on for the controller insert of the contingency message to move the exercise forward in order to test the rest of the objectives did not have the desired outcome.

Recommendation:

- The WHC-EP exercise development team needs to examine the approach for designing the use of contingency messages in relation to the objectives for a particular exercise.

Actionee: G. A. Lovejoy

In relation to the Area ECC and the Event Command Post:

I-6 Issue:

A more systematic sharing of information between the ECP and the Area ECC would enhance the Area ECC's ability to assess the situation and make decisions.

Recommendation:

- Enhance the training for the BED and AED about the importance of the communication link between the ECP and the Area ECC.
- Consider the need to assure that the persons relaying information have adequate technical knowledge, or that the BED and AED speak directly to each other on occasion.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)  
J. B. Schuette

In relation to the Event Command Post:

I-7 Issue:

There was poor segregation of contaminated workers from the non-contaminated workers and the media at the ECP.

Recommendation:

- Evaluate the potential that the Hanford Patrol can be expected to provide assistance with crowd control in a timely manner in the future.
- If patrol assistance is not realistic, consider proceduralizing the responsibility to someone at the ECP or Area ECC.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)  
J. B. Schuette

I-8 Issue:

When the take-cover alarm sounded, some Area personnel did not respond rapidly or appropriately.

Actionee: G. A. Lovejoy

I-9 Issue:

The BED should have called in additional management support team personnel to help reduce the burden on him.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)  
J. B. Schuette

I-10 Issue:

It might have been helpful if a basic status board was used at the ECP.

Recommendation:

- Consider the extent to which this might be feasible or helpful in the various ECP locations and command vehicles, and provide if appropriate.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)  
J. B. Schuette

I-11 Issue:

Although habitability surveys were periodically conducted at the ECP, they were not logged, and no positive contamination control was established, as good practice would dictate.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer (lead)  
J. B. Schuette

I-12 Issue:

A PNL trainer who was present as an observer to gather information for training purposes coached and actively assisted the event command post RPTs.

Actionee: J. B. Schuette

I-13 Issue:

The EDO was not as proactive as he could have been in helping the BED obtain resources.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer

In relation to the 300 Area Emergency Control Center:

I-14 Issue:

There is a need to improve HUDU computer hardware; it has insufficient memory, hard disk/RAM. To run a second run of HUDU you have to re-boot the computer. Also print capability is lacking; in order to print a HUDU report you have to exist the program, get to a DOS prompt and print from there.

Recommendation:

- Since new equipment has arrived since the exercise, have the appropriate hazards assessors test its capabilities prior to the next exercise.

Actionee: R. H. Palmer

I-15 Issue:

Request head set and copy of procedures for action recommendations for alert status. (Made by 300 ECC Security Representative)

Actionee: R. H. Palmer

In relation to support for the River Alerting process

I-16 Issue:

The objectives for demonstration of the activation process for supporting offsite authorities for Columbia River alerting could not be evaluated because of an exercise controller error in the direction of the PNL boat team to the staging area and the timing of their picket and audibility demonstration.

This mainly was a problem with the exercise control.

Recommendation:

- Evaluate way in which instructions are provided to controllers, to assure that they understand their instructions.
- Include river alerting in the near future in another exercise.

Actionee: G. A. Lovejoy

In relation to communications among control centers:

I-17 Issue:

It appears that the ONC call lists and procedures may result in a few redundant notifications, which are desirable to be avoided if possible to reduce time spent in notifications.

Recommendation:

- Cross-check ENS lists and other call lists to identify redundancies and evaluate if there is a need or not to retain both calls.

Actionee: D. J. Connell

I-18 Issue:

The inauguration of the DOE-crash phone link from the EACT to the Washington State EOC, the Bi-County EOC, and the Supply System resulted in some delays and inconsistencies in information relayed via this line.

Recommendation:

- Evaluate the various problems with the use of the line related to this initial test of the procedures
- Evaluate the policy for the use of this line by the RL-EACT and other parties, with respect to appropriate purposes and information transfer.
- Retrain the RL-EACT users of the line, including Communicator #2 and the Deputy Director in the appropriate procedures for initiating the line, reading the message form, and clarifying information.
- Evaluate again in the next appropriate exercise.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

I-19 Issue:

The RL-EACT Communicator #4 was not always able to complete an entire cycle of required calls before the next update of the notification information was ready to be relayed to his contact list.

Recommendation:

- Evaluate the distribution of the communication work load among the four RL-EACT Communicators and adjust if necessary.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

I-20 Issue:

The EACT Logistics and Planning Director needs to know the real numbers he's required to



call [re county EOC]; they are not currently in the procedure.

Recommendation:

- Since the correct numbers are to be provided to the Logistics and Planning Director by the RL or contractor representatives when they arrive at the county EOC and find out what these numbers are at their position, these representatives need to have this emphasized in their training.
- EOC Representative training needs to emphasize that there are procedures for that position and they should be referred to.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

I-21 Issue:

The RL Representative to the Bi-County EOC does not have the RL-ECC phone numbers.

Recommendation:

- Since this was apparently a misperception on his part, because the numbers can be found in his procedure, training of these representatives needs to emphasize the use of their procedure.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

I-22 Issue:

In an outward communication, a message was given from EACT that there was "no release." It would be better to say "have not confirmed a release."

Recommendation:

- Consider the appropriate points in the EACT organization for training emphasis on this point, such as to the Public Affairs Director about his/her role in the formation of notifications and other messages, and the Communications Officer, who prepares the messages.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

In relation to the Joint Information Center (JIC)

I-23 Issue:

There is a need to improve the management of information with in the process for responding to public inquiries about the event.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate how information made available to the phone team is compiled for their easy use, and adjust this if indicated.
- Examine procedures and practice for the phone team to receive initial briefings and for sharing new information once the response function is under way, and adjust procedures for training where necessary.
- Try to assure that there is a mix of experienced phone team members with new less experienced members during exercises and other training.

Actionee: W. P. Whiting

I-24 Issue:

There needs to be a better understanding among some of the offsite agencies regarding press release distribution and coordination at the decision table in the JIC in order to assure the timely release of information by DOE.

Recommendation:

- Review with offsite agencies operating out of the JIC the policy relating to the sharing among agencies of information prepared for public release, which does not include a requirement for approval of each other's releases.

Actionee: W. P. Whiting

I-25 Issue:

Benton/Franklin County PIOs did not play during the exercise, thereby reducing the opportunity for the county to provide confirming or updated information to press releases and news conferences.

Recommendation

- Inquire of each of the county emergency management organizations if they intent to send a PIO in the event of a real emergency; if so, exercises should be designed to practice with this position filled by an actor when the county PIOs are not present.

Actionee: G. A. Lovejoy

In relation to the RL Emergency Action and Coordinating Team (EACT)

I-26 Issue:

Press Actors showed guard their regular Hanford badges to gain access to the RL-EACT (which they would not have had if the were media people)

Recommendation:

· Since it has been discovered that some members of the local press do have Hanford badges, it may be necessary to develop access criteria for the EACT (and other centers) in order to avoid disruption of emergency response actions by the media at these locations.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

I-27 Issue:

Some EACT members took over some of the responsibilities that should have been completed by others.

Recommendation:

- Encourage EACT members to use exercises as an opportunity to coach and assist, but not replace, newer member during exercises, so learning can be enhanced.

Actionee: S. M. Faulk

In relation to the activation of medical assets for emergency decontamination.

I-28 Issue:

The emergency generator position at the Emergency Decontamination Facility (EDF) was blocked by construction activity when the emergency generator (for backup power) was delivered to the EDF.

Recommendation

- Work with the facility preparedness maintenance person to have a sign placed at the space requesting that it not be blocked, and to incorporate a check of the outside of the facility in his periodic preparedness maintenance checklist.

Actionee: S. M. Gilchrist